Doklam Standoff….A sign of increasing Sino-Indian strain
On 16th June 2017, the Indian National Army (INA) and China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stood face-off at a tri-junction border area of India, China, and Bhutan, namely ‘Doklam plateau’. This Sino-Indian border dispute, involving Bhutan is known as Doklam Standoff.
Beijing, with the help of PLA, was trying to infiltrate into Bhutan’s territory ‘Doklam area’ by extending a disputed border road. India, as sworn protector of Bhutan, opposed Chinese attempt deploying INA troops on 18th June. INA and PLA troops stood off two months face to face, until the issue was resolved on 28th August, with a halt of the Chinese road construction. But, the strain still exists between the two nations as there was not official conclusion of the disagreement.
Doklam or ‘Donglang Chaochang’ (in Chinese) is bounded by Tibet’s (now part of China) Chumbi valley in the North, Bhutan’s Ha valley in the east and India’s Sikkim state in the west. There are two adjacent ridges, separated by the Doklam plateau, along the southern end of Chumbi valley. The entire valley encompasses 89 square km of area and it is claimed by Bhutan.
In 1988 and 1998, two accords were signed between Bhutan and China to maintain tranquility and peace along their border where final settlement on boundary demarcation is still pending. The agreements also depict that any kind of unilateral action or usage of military forces, aimed to amend the status quo of the boundary, will be strongly discouraged by the two nations. Bur despite of 24 rounds of negotiations thereafter, the dispute remains alive, and China still claims the Doklam plateau.
In context of Doklam’s strategic significance, internal border expert John Graver has called the dagger shaped Chumbi valley as “the single-most strategically important piece of real estate in the entire Himalayan region.” The Chumbi Valley intervenes between Sikkim and Bhutan in the southern part, whereas the Doklam plateau, due to its height, overlooks the Chumbi valley and India's Siliguri Corridor (often referred as ‘chicken neck’). The single narrow access, strip of only 24kms, that connects the north-eastern part of India with the rest of the country.
According to Indian security experts, China gains three major strategic benefits with the control the Doklam plateau. Firstly, a commanding view of the entire Chumbi Valley. Secondly, the Siliguri Corridor, the Indian defense system in Sikkim, as well as Bhutan’s Zompelri Army base, could be easily outflanked. Also, the grip in the region will bring Chinese close to the edge of the Himalayas where slopes are descending for India and Bhutan. An easy launch-pad for Beijing to supply army and rations in case of war. For New Delhi and Indian National Army Doklam represents a significant “strategic redline’.
China has already constructed a 500km highway, capable of carrying artillery and light tanks from Lhasa (closest city near Chumbi valley) to Chumbi valley in just eight hours. Also, Beijing-Lhasa direct rail network, is expected to be completed by 2020. It will pave a direct path for China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to march right up to India through Nathu-La-Pass.
Beijing is claiming that these infrastructures are being built to facilitate the Army camps, stationed at Chumbi Valley. But according the International border expert G Parthasarathy “China is in ultra-nationalist mood of establishing a hegemony power in Asia. The best thing for China is to sit down and talk.” New Delhi believes that Beijing is changing the security dynamics to its detriment. Changes that could have serious implications for India national security in case of a war-crisis.
As justification to its actions in the Doklam region, China made an astounding claim that Bhutan has acknowledged Chinese presence at Doklam and fully supported Beijing’s activity at the region. It impelled Bhutan to issue a stern statement on 29th June 2017, pointing out that boundary negotiation between China and Bhutan is still enduring and Beijing should abide the agreements of 1988 and 1998, to maintain harmony in that region, rather than making unilateral decisions.
Thimpu afterwards maintained an intellectual silence, justifying that “Bhutan does not want India and China to go to war and it is avoiding pumping up an already heated situation.” The Bhutanese government was worried about Beijing, cutting off the Siliguri corridor that will eventually cut the major supply line of Bhutan’s everyday requirements, travelling from Indian mainland.
Despite of the face to face stand-off of INA and PLA at Doklam, India followed both uncompromising and diplomatic path simultaneously. China was also ransacking to condense the tension by negotiations. These negotiations were headed by Mr. S. Jaishankar, India’s foreign secretary with his Chinese counterpart in silence. Meanwhile, China was hosting the BRICS-2017 summit and New Delhi refused to join until complete withdrawal of PLA from the Doklam area. This could have represented a huge embarrassment of China in front of other participating members of BRICS- Brazil, Russia, and South-Africa. On August 28, 2017, both the nations announced a rapid disengagement on the Doklam region, ending the two months long military face-off.
In current scenario, it would be unwise to portray the ‘withdrawal of Chinese military’ as an Indian victory over the world’s largest army as it does not end the conflict. However, it surely invigorated the India National Army with a profusion of psychological and strategic advantage in both power-game and political forerunning aspects.
Now, all national security stakeholders in India should emerge with a couple of strategic wargames that will encompass political, diplomatic military and logistics issues for a war in two fronts (China and Pakistan). The Doklam issue also educates India to focus on overall development, especially infrastructural network in North East states as well as bolster the relationships with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh through bilateral diplomacy.
Although the probability of Sino-Indian armed conflict could not be nullified, still both the nations should propagate to build a strong strategic and beneficial partnership. We must be hopeful the same is envisioned at very top level with enthusiasm and magnanimity.
References
-What is the Doklam issue all about?
-China says infrastructure in Doklam aimed at improving lives of troops
-India-China standoff: All you need to know about Doklam dispute
-Crisis of Doklam - Historical Perspective, Geography of the Conflict
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