Mackinder delivered a lecture entitled ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ which was published in his book ‘Democratic Ideals and Reality’, later on in 1919.

In the lecture, he formulated his famous Heartland theory that termed the Eurasian region as ‘Pivot Area’; having the capability to become the seat of great power which would ultimately dominate the whole world. (Mackinder, 1904)

Nichols Spyman coined the Theory of Rimland, in 1942 countering Mackinder’s Heartland theory. Spyman stated that Eurasia’s Rimland, the coastal areas, is the key to control the World Island. Spyman said that ‘whoever would control the Rimland, would eventually control the World Island. Whoever would control the World Island would soon control the world’. (Cohen, 2003)

Historically, China developed the Silk Route or Silk Road Economic Belt which linked China with the West enabling it to carry goods and ideas between the two great civilizations of Rome and China. The 4,000-mile (6,400-km) road eased the exchange of good between East and West. Silk went westward from China while wools, gold, and silver went east from Europe, Central Asia and some parts of Middle East. (Britannica, 2018)

China’s unveiling of Maritime Silk Route (MSR) in 2013 under the One Belt – One Road (OBOR) positioned a development stratagem to boost infrastructure connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa. The MSR serves as to complement the OBOR - anciently known as Silk Route - in the maritime domain which focuses on infrastructure development across Central Asia. These initiatives i.e. Maritime Silk Route and historic Silk Route collectively form the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative designed to bolster China's economic influence and political clout across the globe. (Green, 2018)

China has pursued the ‘Strings of Pearls’ strategy for safeguarding its global dominance stretching from South-China Sea to the Bay of Bengal, from the Arabian Sea to Gulf of Aden & further to Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea. Kyaukpyu, in the Bay of Bengal, has remained the centre of attention for China; where China plans to develop Special Economic Zone (SEZ) for transporting oil and gas. China has leased a port in Hambantota, Sri Lanka following this strategy. The Chinese presence in Gwadar Port gives it access to maintain steadfastness over Strait of Malacca in addition to having an eye over Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf. China also maintains a logistics facility in Djibouti near Bab-el-Mandeb for anti-piracy sea patrols in the region. (Green, 2018)

The economic advantage for Southeast Asian (SEA) countries from OBOR initiative will depend largely on the prospect of security, political and economic cooperation between China and these countries. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, in 2012, trade between China and SEA countries touched US$ 400.1 billion mark. But analysts predict that the relative level of gains for SEA countries from OBOR may not align with China as for Middle Eastern countries do because of the different economic priorities of these countries accorded to China. (Henelito A. Sevilla, 2017)

Since 2009, China has been Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) largest trading partner while ASEAN has remained China’s third-largest trading partner, since 2011. The vital economic stability of the Southeast Asian region and its geographical proximity has crafted it to be the centrepiece for OBOR; through which ASEAN's mushrooming economies have become a key priority for it.  ASEAN has developed as a prominent emerging economic partner for China and is the priority destination for Chinese businesses and companies. OBOR is playing a vital role in bridging two of the most dynamic economies of the world i.e. China and Southeast Asian countries, by strengthening economic connections. This practice will also enable the growing Southeast Asian region to augment its connectivity among the 10 member states (ASEAN) by constantly developing their economic zones in Asia and beyond. (Kapahi, 2017)

The initiative will also improve an infrastructure deficit and support industrial development across Southeast Asia. It will also support China’s project of evolving its far-reaching rail networks to deliver technology and services regionally. Countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Laos and Indonesia have already witnessed achievements in railway construction. (Kapahi, 2017)

Despite of the growing economic ties, Southeast Asian countries maintain reservations on China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea (SCS). It has become one of the major bone of contention between China and Southeast Asian countries. Almost one-third of the world’s commercial shipping passes through SCS carrying over $3 trillion in trade each year. In addition to that, the SCS is home to huge reservoirs of oil and natural gas which highlights its global importance. SCS enclosed by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Taiwan remains a hotbed of disputes ranging from militarization of various parts of the ocean to the Paracels and Spratlys Island chains that are seen to be reserves of natural resources. But at the same time, China has tried to normalize ties with its Southeast Asian neighbors and end the difference; most notably its participation in joint exercises with Thailand. (Mitchell & Harding, 2009) (Khan, 2018)

China is also actively pursuing robust officer exchange programs, offering military assistance and exporting important military hardware in addition to using soft power in Southeast Asia for the first time since 1980s. The pursuance comes in order maintain its presence around the global not providing any kind of space to its adversaries to replace it. In an attempt of regional dominance, China is bolstering its relations with Russia and Pakistan so that supremacy it has achieved in one part should not be diminished in the other. The US has tried to counter China’s growing ascendency by regionally as well as globally by carrying out agreements with other countries for example Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – often referred to as the “Quad”. The Quad also includes Australia and Japan along with the United States itself. The budding alliance is arrayed to counter China’s expanding growth, both economically & strategically. (Khan, 2018)

In future, China would probably not only be a source of future financial investment and construction for Southeast Asia but also a huge potential for their future energy revenues. It is comprehensible, however, that some Southeast Asian nations are locked up in prisoner’s dilemma in which they are worried about the real intention of China in the region and the world. This makes such nations not so welcoming of China. The prospects of relations between China and SEA countries also depends on the change of perception of the national leadership of a regional country vis-a-vis China.

Bibliography: 

Britannica, T. E. (2018, June 21). Britannica Encyclopaedia. Retrieved from Brittanica Website: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Silk-Road-trade-route

Cohen, S. B. (2003). Geopolitics of the World System. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Green, M. J. (2018). China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Henelito A. Sevilla, J. (2017). China’s New Silk Route Initiative: Political and Economic Implications for Middle East and Southeast Asia. Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 83-106.

Kapahi, A. (2017, December 12). Southeast Asia: China. Retrieved from Asia Times: http://www.atimes.com/one-belt-one-road-implications-asean-connectivity/

Khan, S. A. (2018, May 30). The Emerging Super-Power Troika. Melange International Magazine. Islamabad, Islamabad, Pakistan: Melange International Magazine.

Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The Geographical Pivot of History. London: Royal Geographical Society.

Mitchell, D. J., & Harding, B. (2009). China and Southeast Asia. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.